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Abstract This article examines the optimal organizational form of project eval-
uation under competition. The evaluations are carried out by two fallible screening
units that sequentially assess projects. Screening can be organized as a hierarchy or
a polyarchy. We show that as competitive pressure rises, the polyarchy becomes less
attractive. Therefore, different organizational forms might be found in different
industries depending on the degree of competition. In addition, we examine
endogenous screening rules under competition: For symmetric situations, we show
that polyarchies will employ higher decision thresholds compared to hierarchies.
Nonetheless, as in the case of exogenous screening rules, the hierarchy becomes
more attractive the higher the degree of competition.
Keywords Organization  Project evaluation  Competition
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1 Introduction
Firms often depend on the implementation of new ideas in order to be successful.
The evaluation of potential new projects therefore is an important activity for a firm.
The seminal paper by Sah and Stiglitz (1986) considers this problem of project
evaluation given that individuals are fallible in their project assessment. Thus, it
may be beneficial to ask different individuals to evaluate a given project. The
authors then examine two distinct organizational forms: hierarchies and polyarchies.
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These forms represent different rules to aggregate the information gathered during
the screening process: In a hierarchy, unanimous approval by the screening units is
required for project approval. In contrast, in a polyarchy the approval of only one
screening unit suffices for acceptance.
We extend this framework by considering the effect of competition on the optimal
organization of project evaluation. In particular, we examine a duopolistic situation
where a firm’s payoff for successfully implementing a new project depends on the
implementation decision of its rival. For specificity, one may think of projects
arriving one by one but simultaneously at both firms. Depending on the results of their
screening processes, both firms independently decide whether to implement the
project or not. Three scenarios are possible: (i) both firms accept the same project for
implementation resulting in a competitive outcome; (ii) only one of the two firms
implements the project and derives monopoly rents; (iii) both firms reject the project.
We find that competition renders the polyarchy less attractive. Competition
reduces the value a firm can expect from implementing a good project since in some
cases the other firm implements this project as well. As a consequence, the advantage
of a polyarchy in accepting good projects becomes less important under competition
whereas the advantage of a hierarchical structure in rejecting bad projects remains
unchanged. This effect is more pronounced the higher the degree of competition. In
addition, we show why different organizational structures might prevail in different
industries. We find that all different organizational settings might be found. The
optimal organizational choice depends on the competitive pressure in the industry.
We then extend our setting by allowing endogenous screening rules. In this case
the firm has to determine a decision threshold R for the evaluators: A project is only
accepted if its observed profit is above this reservation level. We find that the
screening in a polyarchy is more conservative than that in a hierarchy (the optimal
decision thresholds will be higher in a polyarchy). This result translates from the
monopolistic case and is thus not changed by the introduction of competition. The
intuition is that in a hierarchy both screening units know that their decisions will be
rechecked at the other unit. In contrast, in a polyarchy no such rechecking occurs
and some of the projects have already been rejected by the other unit. Thus the
polyarchy employs higher screening standards. Nonetheless, as in the case of
exogenous screening rules the hierarchy becomes more attractive the higher the
degree of competition.
The Sah and Stiglitz approach has been extended in different directions. On the
cost side, Koh (1992) introduces variable screening costs whereas Gersbach and
Wehrspohn (1998) consider the effect of a budget constraint for project develop-
ment. Swank and Visser (2008) and Jost and Lammers (forthcoming) consider the
effect of agency problems when agents have reputational concerns or when one of
the agents has to implement the approved projects. Gehrig et al. (2000) examine
endogenous decision thresholds for each screening unit. They find that in some
cases asymmetric decision rules across screening units are optimal. In contrast, in
our setting with competition we focus on symmetric decision rules inside any one
firm. Bull and Ordover (1987) consider a hierarchical decision-making structure and
examine the effect of competition on the number of screening units. Similarly to our
result, they find that screening gets tighter as the degree of competition increases. In
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their case the number of screening units increases. In contrast, in our setting the
optimal organizational form of screening changes and the polyarchy becomes less
attractive compared to the hierarchy.
Most closely related to our setting is Gehrig (2004). He examines a setting of
R&D with two firms acting in two distinct markets. He discusses how different
forms of cooperation effect a firm’s willingness to invest in information acquisition.
In contrast, we consider a strictly competitive setting without cooperation.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we present the basic model. In
Sect. 3, we investigate the effect of competition on the optimal organizational form.
In Sect. 4, we examine endogenous decision thresholds under competition. Sect. 5
concludes.
2 The basic model
Let us consider first a market environment in which a single firm operates. This
setting has been extensively analyzed starting with the seminal paper by Sah and
Stiglitz (1986). The firm faces a sequence of projects with unknown value. To
evaluate projects the firm can use one of the following two types of organizational
forms: (1) A hierarchy with two evaluation units in which each unit screens a project
and a project is approved only if both units suggest its implementation. (2) A
polyarchy with two evaluation units in which a project is accepted for implemen-
tation if at least one unit recommends it.
We consider a portfolio of projects which consists only of two types of projects,
good and bad projects. A good project’s return is zM [ 0, a bad project’s return is
-zB \ 0. The ex ante probability that an evaluation unit faces a good project is a. Let
b :¼ azMð1 aÞzB
denote the quality of the project pool. b = 1 then represents the case in which the
portfolio is moderate, that is, the expected value of a project selected is zero. This
happens, for example, if the number of good and bad projects is equal (a ¼ 1
2
) and
projects’ returns are symmetric (zM = zB). Hence, portfolios with b\ 1 have low
quality with a\1
2
and/or zM \ zB and those with b[ 1 have high quality with a[ 12
and/or zM [ zB.
The organizational units perform project screenings to identify the potential
value of a project. However, these evaluations are done with judgement errors. On
the one hand, if the project is actually good, we denote with p1 [ [0,1] the
probability that the information signals a positive return of the project, whereas with
probability (1 - p1) the screening indicates a negative return. In the last case, the
screen would not recommend implementation although the project is good (Type-I-
error). On the other hand, if the real nature of the project is bad, the information
signals a positive return of the project with probability p2 [ [0,1] and with
probability (1 - p2) the information indicates a negative return. In the first case, the
unit would propose the implementation of a bad project (Type-II-error). We assume
that evaluation has some discriminating capability, that is p1 [ p2. We further
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assume that each unit observes an independent signal about the project’s type and
that all units are identical with respect to their screening abilities.
The conditional probability that a project is accepted for implementation then
depends on the organizational form of the evaluation process. In a polyarchy the
recommendation of only one unit is necessary for implementation, resulting in an
acceptance rate of p2 ? 2p(1 - p) = p(2 - p). In a hierarchy, a project is
implemented only if both units approve it, thus the acceptance rate is p2 and lower
than the one in a polyarchy.
Of course, whether it is beneficial for the organization to accept more or fewer
projects depends on the quality b of the initial portfolio. A hierarchy results in
higher expected profits if the initial portfolio is sufficiently bad, whereas a
polyarchy is better if the portfolio is sufficiently good. Sah and Stiglitz (1986)
provide the reasoning for this finding: For a given screening function, the relative
advantage of a polyarchy is in accepting good projects, whereas the relative
advantage of a hierarchy is in rejecting bad projects. To see this, let
PH ¼ ap21zM  ð1 aÞp22zB
¼ ð1 aÞzB bp21  p22
 
;
PP ¼ ap1ð2 p1ÞzM  ð1 aÞp2ð2 p2ÞzB
¼ ð1 aÞzBðbp1ð2 p1Þ  p2ð2 p2ÞÞ
be the expected profits in case of a hierarchy and a polyarchy, respectively. Then the
relative advantage of a polyarchy over a hierarchy is
PP PH ¼ 2ð1 aÞzBðbp1ð1 p1Þ  p2ð1 p2ÞÞ ð1Þ
and PH is smaller than PP if b is sufficiently large ðb[ p2ð1p2Þp1ð1p1ÞÞ; and vice versa.
1
Thus, the optimal organizational form depends on the quality of the project pool b
and on the screening technology
p2ð1p2Þ
p1ð1p1Þ :
3 Project evaluation under competition
3.1 Symmetric organizational forms
We now extend the basic framework of Sect. 2 and consider a market environment
with two competing firms, A and B. Both firms face the same pool of projects and
screen the projects independently. For specificity, one may think of projects arriving
one by one but simultaneously at both firms. Depending on the results of their
screening processes both firms independently decide whether to implement the
1 In our setting the firm would never choose to have only one evaluation unit. The reason is that we do
not consider evaluation costs or time to market considerations. Therefore, it always pays off to allow the
possibility of a second screening: If the initial portfolio is good, the polyarchy offers the advantage to
screen a project a second time that has already been declined by the first screening unit. The probability of
a Type-I-error is therefore reduced. If the initial portfolio is bad, the hierarchy requires both screening
units to recommend a project before it gets implemented. The probability of a costly Type-II-error thus
can be reduced.
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project or not. Three scenarios are possible: (1) Both firms accept the same project
for implementation resulting in a competitive outcome. (2) Only one of the two
firms implements the project and derives monopoly rents. (3) Both firms reject the
project.
How does competition affect the organizational design of project screening? To
answer this question, we need to introduce competition in our setting. The effect of
competition may depend on several factors such as the number of competitors,
whether competition is in prices or quantities and how much products are
differentiated. We take a very general setup as in Schmidt (1997) where the degree
of competition is expressed through its effect on the profit function of the firm: If
competition increases, profits go down. In particular, let zM as before be the
monopoly rent if only one firm implements a good project and let zD be the value of
the good project under competition, that is, if both firms implement the same
project. We assume that competition reduces firms’ revenue from projects compared
to a monopoly situation, that is, 0 B zD B zM. If both firms act in the same market
and products are perfect substitutes, we have zD B zM/2 that is, the best situation for
both firms in the duopolistic case is when monopoly rents are equally split. If both
firms act in independent markets or products are not perfect substitutes, we could
have zD C zM/2. In the extreme, if zD = zM, a successful implementation of a project
by one firm in one market does not influence the value of this project for the second
firm in its home market.
Let
c :¼ aðzM  zDÞð1 aÞzB
denote the reduced quality of the project pool under competition if a firm receives
the duopoly value of a project instead of its monopoly rents. Through the parameter
zD, c can also be seen as a measure of the degree of competition. If competition
reduces the value of good projects to zero, i.e. zD = 0, then c = b and all monopoly
rents are lost if both firms implement the project. If the monopoly rent is split under
competition, zD = zM/2, the quality of the project pool under competition is also
split and we have c = b/2. And finally, if firms act in completely independent
markets, zD = zM, competition does not influence the expected value of projects,
c = 0.
This setting can also be related to a duopolistic setup with differentiated goods, as
for example in Schmutzler (2007). Here the degree of competition (zD and the
resulting c) corresponds to a measure of substitutability of the goods. In a richer
oligopolistic setting one could also think of zD (and c) as a measure of the number of
firms active in the market. That is, the more firms compete, the lower will be zD and
the higher c.
First, we consider symmetric organizational forms where both firms choose the
same organizational structure. That is, either both firms are organized as a hierarchy
or both are organized as a polyarchy.
Proposition 1 For symmetric organizational forms, competition renders the
polyarchy less attractive.
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Proof Denote as Pij, i,j [ {H,P} the expected profit of firm i choosing
organizational form i given that its competitor is organized according to j. For
symmetric organizational forms we have:
PHH ¼ ap21 p21zD þ ð1 p21ÞzM
  ð1 aÞp22zB;
PPP ¼ ap1ð2 p1Þ p1ð2 p1ÞzD þ ð1 p1ð2 p1ÞÞzMð Þ
 ð1 aÞp2ð2 p2ÞzB:
Under a hierarchical structure, for example, the ex ante probability that both firms
implement a good project is given by p1
2p1
2 while the probability that only one firm
accepts this project for implementation is p1
2(1 - p1
2). Simple calculation then shows
that the relative advantage of a polyarchical structure over a hierarchy in case of
competition is
PPP PHH ¼ 2ð1 aÞzB bp1ð1 p1Þ  p2ð1 p2Þ  2cp21 1 p1ð Þ
 
; ð2Þ
hence the difference to the relative advantage in case of monopoly, see Eq. (1), is
PPP PHHð Þ  PP PHð Þ ¼ 4ap21 1 p1ð ÞðzM  zDÞ ð3Þ
which is always negative. (
The intuition for this result is that competition reduces the value a firm can
expect from implementing a good project. This is because in some cases the other
firm implements this project as well. As a consequence, the advantage of a
polyarchy in accepting good projects becomes less important under competition
whereas the advantage of a hierarchical structure in rejecting bad projects remains
unchanged. Hence, a hierarchy performs better than a polyarchy under compe-
tition than under monopoly and this advantage is higher, the higher the degree of
competition.
The influence of the market environment on the relative advantage of polyarchies
over hierarchies is summarized in Fig. 1 for the case that the quality of the project
pool is moderate, b = 1. If both firms act in completely independent markets,
zD = zM (c = 0), competition has no effect on the optimal choice of the
organizational form, see Eq. (3). Using Eq. (1), we immediately see that a
polyarchy results in higher expected profits if p2 \ 1 - p1, that is, in the area
0B0X1. Increasing competition, that is lowering zD, implies increasing c and the
symmetric polyarchical structure becomes less beneficial compared to hierarchical
structures, see Eq. (2), and is better only in the area 0BcX1 for c\12; respectively
0BcX 1
2c
for c [ 1
2
: In the extreme case in which competition reduces the competitive
outcome to zD = 0 and c = 1, a symmetric polyarchy is better than a symmetric
hierarchy only in the area 0B1X1
2
:
The picture changes slightly, if the project pool is better or worse, that is, b = 1
(Fig. 2). Using Eq. (3), we know that for zD = zM competition has no effect on
relative advantages and, by Eq. (1), a lower quality of the project pool successively
diminishes the area for which a symmetric polyarchy performs better than
hierarchical structures to 0B0
0
X1. As before, this area shrinks as competition
increases. If competition revenues are zero, zD = 0 and c = b, the area is 0Bb
0
Xb
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Fig. 1 Advantage of polyarchy over hierarchy for varying degrees of competition (with b = 1)
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Fig. 2 Advantage of polyarchy over hierarchy for different degrees of project quality (b = 1)
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where polyarchy dominates hierarchy is smallest. The reverse holds if the project
pool is good, that is, b[ 1. In this case, polyarchical structures are better than
hierarchical ones outside the area X1B0
00
1.
Our findings are of a similar nature to those in Bull and Ordover (1987). These
authors consider a purely hierarchical decision-making structure and examine the
effect of competition on the number of screening units. They show that as the
expected return of projects falls, e.g. due to competition or different cost
structures, the number of screening units increases and thus screening gets tighter.
In contrast, in our setting screening gets tighter through a change in the optimal
organizational form, i.e., the polyarchy becomes less attractive compared to the
hierarchy.
Decision making procedures inside firms are often difficult to assess from the
outside. However, our result that the polyarchy becomes less attractive as
competitive pressure rises, seems to be consistent with evidence from practice.
For instance, in Germany decision-making responsibilities of the Supervisory Board
have changed considerably over the last 10 years. As competitive pressure has risen
due to the globalization and technological change, the role of the Supervisory Board
has changed. Once the focus was on pure monitoring, whereas nowadays the role
has changed to co-decision-making, where Management and Supervisory Board
both have to agree to important decisions (Cromme 2005).
3.2 Equilibrium organizational forms
Of course, firms can decide to organize their screening differently. To analyze the
optimal organizational form we consider the following course of interactions: In a
first stage firms simultaneously choose the organizational form of their screening
process. Within this organizational form firms simultaneously screen a sequence of
projects in the second stage. Depending on their evaluations firms implement those
projects accepted by their screening units.
The following proposition summarizes the equilibrium organizational structures:
Proposition 2 In case of competition the following organizational forms are
optimal. If
1. c[ 1
p2
1
ðb p2ð1p2Þp1ð1p1ÞÞ; (H,H) is the optimal organizational form, and
PHH [ PPP;
2. c 2 ð 1p1ð2p1Þðb
p2ð1p2Þ
p1ð1p1ÞÞ; 1p21ðb
p2ð1p2Þ
p1ð1p1ÞÞÞ; there exist two asymmetric equilib-
ria (P,H) and (H,P), and
PPH [ PHP;
3. c\ 1p1ð2p1Þðb
p2ð1p2Þ
p1ð1p1ÞÞ; (P,P) is the optimal organizational form, and
PPP [ PHH if c\ 12p1ðb
p2ð1p2Þ
p1ð1p1ÞÞ;
PPP\PHH otherwise:
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Proof see Appendix The Proposition shows why different organizational
structures might prevail in different industries. The optimal organizational choice
now depends not only on the screening technology
p2ð1p2Þ
p1ð1p1Þ and the quality of the
initial project pool b, but also on the competitive pressure in the industry. If the
firms operate in distinct markets (zD = zM)c = 0), we are back in the monopoly
case of Sect. 2 with b[ reqqlessp2ð1p2Þp1ð1p1Þ determining the optimal organization. For
b\p2ð2p2Þp1ð2p1Þ the hierarchy is the optimal organizational form in the monopolistic case,
and since we have c C 0, the hierarchy stays optimal under competition.
In contrast, consider in the following the case where
p2ð1p2Þ
p1ð1p1Þ\b: Then, without
competition the firm would organize as a polyarchy. However, with competition this
does not need to be optimal any longer. As competitive pressure rises, the optimal
organizational form changes: The polyarchy becomes less attractive since monopoly
rents are no longer earned for sure. Therefore, the stronger the competition (low
values zD ) high c), the more likely is that both firms will organize as a hierarchy.
For a market with intermediate competitive pressure, we have the case that one
firm chooses the hierarchy and the other firm the polyarchy as organizational form.
Then, the polyarchy earns higher expected profits. The reason is that in this case a
monopolistic firm would choose to organize as a polyarchy. Accepting projects is
therefore per se attractive. The polyarchy will accept more projects than the
hierarchy since the decision rule is less restrictive. Therefore, the polyarchy is more
often in the position to be the only firm in the market to accept a given project and is
therefore more often able to earn monopoly rents.
In this case we could also see a monopolist preventing entry from a rival firm if
this entry would entail an intermediate competitive pressure. The monopolist, being
the first to choose his organizational form and deciding to organize as a polyarchy,
would earn higher expected profits then the rival firm. For PPH [ 0 and PHP \ 0,
the potential rival would thus refrain from entering the industry. As a consequence
the monopolist would earn even higher expected profits PP [ PPH.
For industries with little competition, both firms should choose a polyarchical
structure. However, as the competitive pressure rises slightly, we have PPP \PHH
and the firms would be better off if they could commit to both organizing as a
hierarchy. However, this commitment is hard to enforce. Each firm would have a
strong incentive to deviate to a polyarchy in order to earn monopoly rents more
often. Since the organizational structure is hard to monitor from the outside,
cooperation would be threatened to fail. In situations with a low to medium
competitive pressure we thus have the classic situation of a Prisoners’ Dilemma:
Both firms could gain from cooperation, however, both have an incentive to defect.
4 Endogenous screening rules
The screening units in the above model receive a binary imperfect signal with
regard to the quality of the projects. In this setting p1 (p2) is the exogenous
probability that the information signals a positive return given the project is good
(bad). In a more general case, the units will receive a richer set of signals that has to
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be processed. In this case each firm has to decide under what conditions the
screening unit should approve a given project for implementation.
For instance, a unit observes a signal y = z ? h of the project’s monopolistic
return z and an independently distributed error h with distribution function M(h). As
before we consider two types of projects: good and bad. We follow Sah and Stiglitz
(1986) and assume that the screening units can only communicate binary
information, that is, whether they think that a project is good or bad. Therefore
the firm has to determine a decision threshold R for the evaluators: A project is only
accepted if its observed profit is above this reservation level.2 The endogenous
screening function p(z,R) is then given by
pðz; RÞ :¼ probðyRÞ ¼ 1 MðR zÞ:
We have
opðz;RÞ
oR ¼ p0ðRÞ 0: The higher the decision threshold, the lower the
probability that a given project is accepted. We denote the probability to accept a
good project with p1(R) = p(z = zM,R) and the probability to accept a bad project
p2(R) = p(z = zB,R).
4.1 Optimal decision thresholds under competition
We consider the same competitive environment as described in Sect. 3. In a first
step both firms simultaneously decide on their organizational form. They are then
able to observe each other’s decision. What is new compared to Sect. 3 is a second
step where both firms simultaneously choose their respective decision threshold.3
As in Sah and Stiglitz (1986) we assume that the profit functions Pij with
i,j [ {H,P} are concave with respect to R.4 Then, the optimal decision threshold Rij
for firm i given the organizational form and the decision threshold of firm j has to
solve:
oPHH
oRHH
¼ 0 , b cp21
 
p01 R
HH
 
p1 R
HH
  ¼ p02 RHH
 
p2 R
HH
 
;
oPPP
oRPP
¼ 0 , b cp1 2 p1ð Þð Þp01 RPP
 
1 p1 RPP
   ¼ p02 RPP
 
1 p2 RPP
  
;
oPHP
oRHP
¼ 0 , b cp1 2 p1ð Þð Þp01 RHP
 
p1 R
HP
  ¼ p02 RHP
 
p2 R
HP
 
;
oPPH
oRPH
¼ 0 , b cp21
 
p01 R
PH
 
1 p1 RPH
   ¼ p02 RPH
 
1 p2 RPH
  
: ð4Þ
For c = 0 both firms operate in separate markets and we are in the monopolistic
situation. For c[ 0 the following proposition shows comparative statics of the
competitive decision thresholds.
2 See also Gehrig et al. (2000) who consider endogenous screening rules for each screening unit
separately.
3 The timing of the interaction is based on the assumption that the organizational form is a more long-
term decision compared to the definition of the decision threshold.
4 See Sah and Stiglitz, Footnote 7. The profit functions under competition Pij are given in the Appendix.
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Proposition 3 In a competitive environment the following result holds irrespective
of the organizational forms of both firms: An increase in the competitive pressure in
the industry (decrease in zD) increases the decision threshold. That is
oRij
ozD
\0 for
i,j [ {H,P}.
Proof see Appendix The intuition behind this result can be related to the
monopolistic setting: A stronger competitive pressure translates to a reduced payoff
from successfully implementing a good project. At the same time the loss from
implementing a bad project remains unchanged. Therefore, a stronger competition
has a similar effect as a decrease in the good project’s return. Fewer projects should
be accepted and thus the decision threshold should be higher.
Proposition 4 For symmetric organizational forms, the decision thresholds will be
higher for polyarchies compared to hierarchies, that is RPP [ RHH.
Proof see Appendix The screening in a polyarchy is more conservative than that
in a hierarchy. This result from the monopolistic case is thus not changed by the
introduction of competition.5 The intuition is that in a hierarchy the first screening
unit knows that its decision to approve a project is rechecked at the second unit. And
the second unit knows that all projects it receives have already received a favorable
assessment. In contrast, in a polyarchy each unit knows that its decision will not be
rechecked. In addition, some of the projects have already been rejected by the other
unit. To reflect these differences, the optimal decision thresholds will be higher in a
polyarchy.
4.2 Effect of competition on the optimal organization
We now examine the optimal organizational form with endogenous screening rules
under competition. Define k :¼ ðp01p1Þ=ð
p0
2
p2
Þ: For the monopolistic situation it can be
shown that for k C 1 the hierarchy performs better than the polyarchy.6 For
competition we can derive the following result:
Proposition 5 For symmetric organizational forms with endogenous screening
rules, the hierarchy performs better than the polyarchy if k b2cp1b2cp1þcp21 ¼zMðzMzDÞ2p1
zMðzMzDÞp1ð2p1Þ:
Proof From (4) we have ðb cp1ð2 p1ÞÞp01ðRPPÞð1 p1ðRPPÞÞ ¼ p02ðRPPÞ
ð1 p2ðRPPÞÞ: Using the definition of k at R = RPP we get
k b 2cp1 þ cp21
 
p1ð1 p1Þ  p2ð1 p2Þ ¼ 0:
For symmetric organizational forms the hierarchy performs better than the poly-
archy if (see Eq. (8) in the Appendix):
ðb 2cp1Þp1ð1 p1Þ  p2ð1 p2Þ\ 0:
5 For the monopolistic case see Sah and Stiglitz (1986), Proposition 4.
6 Follwing Sah and Stiglitz (1986), Proposition 7.
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Therefore, for k b2cp1b2cp1þcp21 ¼
zMðzMzDÞ2p1
zMðzMzDÞp1ð2p1Þ; the hierarchy performs better than
the polyarchy. Note that b2cp1b2cp1þcp21
\1: (
Under monopoly, that is for zD = zM and c = 0, the necessary condition for the
hierarchy to outperform the polyarchy is k C 1, as in Sah and Stiglitz. Under
competition, Proposition 5 shows that the hierarchy becomes more attractive the
higher the degree of competition (the lower zD), that is
o
ozD
zM  ðzM  zDÞ2p1
zM  ðzM  zDÞp1ð2 p1Þ
 
[ 0:
This result mimics our findings in Proposition 1.
5 Conclusion
How does competition effect the optimal organization of project evaluation? Using
the framework by Sah and Stiglitz (1986) we explored this question in a simple
duopoly model in which firms independently decide whether to evaluate projects in
a hierarchical or polyarchical screening process. We found that competition in
principle makes the hierarchy more attractive than the polyarchy although for an
intermediate degree of competitive pressure organizational structures might be
asymmetric.
In the present framework we have assumed that both firms have identical
screening technologies such that evaluations are done with the same judgement
errors. The introduction of heterogenous firm-specific screening functions would
modify our findings without changing our main results. As in the case of a
monopolistic firm a lower Type-I-error or a higher Type-II-error renders the
polyarchy less attractive. However, although this effect of heterogenous screening
functions influences the thresholds under which organizational forms are optimal,
the pattern of equilibrium structures remains unchanged.
The present model does not examine time to market considerations. Time to
market measures the length of time it takes from product research until the project is
available for sale. Then, the firm that is first to introduce the product to the market is
able to realize monopolistic rents for some time and could create a first mover
advantage. This consideration is especially important in industries where products
are outmoded quickly. When the follower enters the market he may only have a
short time left to realize profits. If screenings are extensive and time-consuming,
time to market considerations would favor the polyarchy since some projects are
already implemented after the first screening.
Another extension of our model would be the introduction of oligopolistic
industry structures. However, changing the degree of competitive pressure in the
duopoly case is similar to changing the number of firms under otherwise identical
environmental market conditions: The value of good projects decreases the more
firms implement them. Hence, an increase in the number of firms in an industry
makes hierachical project evaluation more attractive.
152 P.-J. Jost, F. Lammers
123
In line with the paper by Gehrig (2004) it would be interesting to discuss how
different forms of cooperations between firms would affect the optimal organiza-
tional form. In particular, if the competitive pressure was low such that firms
organize polyarchical in equilibrium although they would jointly benefit from
hierarchical structures, cooperation would be profitable. The question which form of
cooperation induces joint profit maximization under these circumstances is scope
for future research.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2 To prove this proposition, let Pij be the expected profit of a
firm that chooses an organizational structure i [ {H,P} whereas its competitor
decided for an organizational structure j [ {H,P}. Then
PHH ¼ ap21 p21zD þ ð1 p21ÞzM
  ð1 aÞp22zB
¼ ð1 aÞzB bp21  p22  cp41
 
PHP ¼ ap21 p1ð2 p1ÞzD þ ð1 p1ð2 p1ÞÞzMð Þ  ð1 aÞp22zB
¼ ð1 aÞzB bp21  p22  cp31ð2 p1Þ
 
PPH ¼ ap1ð2 p1Þ p21zD þ ð1 p21ÞzM
  ð1 aÞp2ð2 p2ÞzB
¼ ð1 aÞzB bp1ð2  p1Þ  p2ð2 p2Þ  cp31ð2 p1Þ
 
PPP ¼ ap1ð2 p1Þ p1ð2 p1ÞzD þ ð1 p1ð2 p1ÞÞzMð Þ  ð1 aÞp2ð2 p2ÞzB
¼ ð1 aÞzB bp1ð2 p1Þ  p2ð2 p2Þ  cp21ð2 p1Þ2
 
We have :
PPP PHH ¼ 2ð1 aÞzB bp1ð1 p1Þ  p2ð1 p2Þ  2cp21 1 p1ð Þ
  ð5Þ
PPP PHP ¼ 2ð1 aÞzB bp1ð1 p1Þ  p2ð1 p2Þ  cp21ð1 p1Þð2 p1Þ
 
PPH PHH ¼ 2ð1 aÞzB bp1ð1 p1Þ  p2ð1 p2Þ  cp31ð1 p1Þ
 
Hence
PPH PHH [ PPP PHP [ PPP PHH :
1. Suppose that PHH [ PPH. Then PHP [PPP and PHH [PPP. Therefore, H is
a best response to H and P. Symmetry implies that (H,H) then is the unique
equilibrium and Pareto-dominates (P,P). We have PHH [PPH if
ðb cp21Þp1ð1 p1Þ\p2ð1 p2Þ:
2. Suppose that PHH \ PPH and PHP [ PPP. Hence P is a best response to H and
H is a best response to P. We have PHH \PPH if ðb cp21Þp1ð1
p1Þ[ p2ð1 p2Þ and PHP [ PPP if ðb cp1ð2 p1ÞÞp1ð1 p1Þ\p2ð1
p2Þ: Therefore, we have PHP \ P PH since p2(1-p2) \ bp1(1-p1).
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3. Suppose that PHP \PPP. Then PHH \ PPH. Therefore, P is a best response to
P and H. P HP \ P PP if (b -c p1(2-p1)) p1(1-p1) [ p2(1-p2). However, we
have P PP [P HH only for (b -2c p1) p1(1-p1) [ p2(1-p2). If the reverse is
true, coordination offers an improvement potential since P PP \ P HH. (
Proof of Proposition 3 We examine the effect of a change in the competitive
pressure on the decision threshold. For example, consider the symmetric case
where both firms organize as a hierarchy. From (4) we have f ðzD; RHHÞ ¼
a
ð1aÞzBðzM  ðzM  zDÞp1ðRHHÞ
2Þp01ðRHHÞp1ðRHHÞ  p02ðRHHÞp2ðRHHÞ ¼ 0 and for
RHH to be a maximum we must have ofoRHH\0: We have
oRHH
ozD
¼ 
of
ozD
of
oRHH
¼  að1 aÞzB
p1ðRHHÞ3p01ðRHHÞ
of
oRHH
\ 0:
since p0(R) \ 0. The same reasoning applies to the other competitive organizational
forms in (4).
Therefore, the stronger the competitive pressure (small zD), the higher will be the
optimal decision threshold.(
Proof of Proposition 4 To see that RPP [ RHH, define cðzÞ :¼ 1pðzÞpðzÞ (i.e. cðzMÞ ¼ð1p1Þ
p1
and cðzBÞ ¼ ð1p2Þp2 :) Calculate
cð0ÞoPHH
oR
 oPPP
oR
¼ 2ap01ðRÞp1 cð0Þ  cðzMÞð Þ zM  p21 zM  zDð Þ
 
þ 2ap01ðRÞp12p1 zM  zDð ÞcðzMÞ 1 p1ð Þ
 2 1 að Þp2p02ðRÞzB cð0Þ  cðzBÞð Þ:
We have c0(z) \ 0 and therefore c(0) - c(zM) [ 0 since zM [ 0. We also have
p0(R) \ 0, therefore the first and the second term are negative. We have c(0) -
c(zB) \ 0 since zB \ 0. We also have p0(R) \ 0, therefore the third term is also
negative. Assume to the contrary that RHH [ RPP. Then from oPPPoR [ cð0ÞoPHHoR it
follows that for RHH [ RPP:
PPP R
HH
 PPP RPP
 
[ c 0; RHH
 
PHH R
HH
  c 0; RPP PHH RPP
 
:
Since cð0; RÞ ¼ MðRÞ
1MðRÞ; we have
o
oRcð0; RÞ ¼ mðRÞð1MðRÞÞ2 [ 0 and thus c(0,R
HH)
[ c(0,RPP). Therefore,
c 0; RHH
 
PHH R
HH
 
 c 0; RPP PHH RPP
 
[ c 0; RPP
 
PHH R
HH
 PHH RPP
  
:
Hence, for RHH [ RPP we must have
PPP R
HH
 PPP RPP
 
[ c 0; RPP
 
PHH R
HH
 PHH RPP
  
:
The LHS is negative since the optimal R is RPP. The RHS is positive since the
optimal R is RHH and c(0,RPP) [ 0. This contradicts RHH [ RPP. (
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